Strengthening collaborative governance could transform the UK’s Westminster model, fostering 'embedded autonomy' seen in other states. The UK government is showing increasing willingness to focus on specific proposals for investment, infrastructure, and regeneration, writes Mark Sandford, House of Commons Library.
In December 2024 the UK Government published a white paper on English devolution, Power and partnership: Foundations for growth. Three pages of this 118-page document were devoted to restructuring England’s system of county and district councils. This is a vexed question with a long history, and predictably, these proposals generated a wealth of column inches, protests from councils facing abolition, and jostling amongst local politicians seeking to benefit.
This turmoil was unfortunate, as it obscured features of the white paper that would be novel in the UK. The Government has described devolution as “a new way of governing”. This is visible in the white paper’s commitments to forms of collaborative governance – joint working between the Government and mayors on defined policy initiatives. Of course, there are many steps between declared intentions and permanently adjusting civil service practice and culture in a way that would make those intentions stick. The fact that this approach featured so regularly in the white paper, plus the detailed nature of many of the commitments, gives some cause to anticipate change. It also aligns with the Labour Party’s emphasis on partnership in its 2024 manifesto and the concept of ‘missions’ in government.
The shadow of centralism
Collaboration between central departments and mayors, or local authorities, is notable by its absence in the UK. As a rule, tiers of government – central / local / devolved, or even different local tiers – do not develop joint plans, backed with pooled funding and resources, to tackle policy challenges. Most UK governments stand alone. They might occasionally contract with, or provide grant funding to, one another. But for the most part they adopt what Rod Rhodes (1988) called ‘exchange relationships’, in which each tier had resources that the other needed and bargains were struck accordingly.
This ideal of autonomous governments is implicit within the concepts of the ‘British political tradition’ and the Westminster model. This portrays the UK’s system of government as characterised by a unitary state; Parliamentary sovereignty; strong cabinet government; accountability through free and fair elections; majority party control of the executive; and institutionalised opposition (Gamble 1990).
Devolving and decentralising power is a challenge with this political backdrop. There is no doubt that change has come with the current wave of English devolution policy since 2014, but it has certainly been incremental. That same political culture makes it easy for supporters of devolution to view proposals for collaborative governance cynically. They can be portrayed as substitutes for ‘real devolution’, symptomatic of a UK state that talks localism but cannot bring itself to let go.
A pyramid of collaborative governance
To shed greater light on what collaborative governance in English mayoral authorities would entail, I have categorised upwards of two dozen commitments in the white paper as follows. These are set out in ascending order of the degree of influence available to mayoral leaderships, with examples in each case of the type of activities being referred to:
Exploring – departments considering what they could work on with mayors in the future. For instance, DCMS is to explore “potential for deeper collaborative partnerships with strategic authorities to share expertise” (p72). The Government will “continue to seek opportunities for increased co-commissioning between probation and local partners” (p85). Great British Railways will engage with mayors “on how local rail ambitions can be reflected in the national rail planning processes” (p51).
Consultation and support – there are multiple commitments to ‘support’ mayors: for instance, Government support is promised for mayors to establish “clear pathways of progression from education into both further and higher education and local employment opportunities” (p55). The future National Energy System Operator will “engage with them [mayors] as it develops Regional Energy Strategic Plans” (p75).
This category covers frequent proposals to ‘work with’ mayors. In some cases, it can extend to creating a joint body or series of formal meetings, but in practice this may amount to little.
Having regard – requiring institutions to take account of mayoral policies when designing their own priorities. For instance, certain public bodies, “such as Homes England, Network Rail and National Highways [will have to] have appropriate regard to relevant Strategic Authority strategies” (p43). If this requirement to ‘have regard’ takes statutory form, it could provide significant influence for mayors over public bodies which, up till now, have remained at one remove from place leadership.
Co-creation – commitments from public sector (and other) actors to identify common problems and design solutions jointly, despite unequal powers (Ansell and Torfing 2021). For instance, the government will “work in close partnership with Strategic Authorities to design, develop, and test the National Jobs and Careers Service” (p59). This type of commitment can also be expressed as ‘co-design’ of policy or ‘agreeing priorities’.
Lead local institution – strategic priorities in the locality are determined by mayors (even if they do not control all bodies and funding). For instance, mayors are to have “a central role in convening local youth careers provision within the national context” (p59), and to be able to “steer and monitor Homes England’s progress in delivering on objectives” (p62).
The latter two categories have affinities to ‘metagovernance’ (Bailey and Wood 2017) at the mayoral level. This term implies that a fragmented public sphere and networks of influence remain in place, but that the mayoral leadership attempts to harness and direct them: ‘steering not rowing’. This aligns with the White Paper’s focus on mayoral strategies and plans.
Is this really change?
It is legitimate to respond to these proposed changes by expressing scepticism about what difference they will make. Rhetoric in a white paper does not guarantee changed practices in central-local relationships in the long term. Repeated initiatives and incentives would be required to counter the shared assumptions of the Westminster model. Within collaborative governance, it is difficult to identify whether local leaders have ‘really’ driven change or whether ministers have operated in the spirit of “I’ll give you anything you ask for – as long as it’s not something I don’t want to give”.
Nevertheless, strengthening collaborative governance has the potential to be transformative within the ‘Westminster model’. It could drive the exchange relationship towards the type of ‘embedded autonomy’ that characterises central-local government relationships in other states. And the signs are that UK government behaviours are beginning to shift on this front, with some greater willingness within Government to focus on specifics: proposals to attract inward investment, develop infrastructure and regenerate places. Place leadership works when it dovetails national specialist expertise with local knowledge and networks. Repeated engagement between central and local officials can generate trust and greater appreciation of the challenges each side faces.
The newly-established Council of the Nations and Regions, and the Mayoral Council, could provide a mechanism to assess whether these initiatives are changing the nature of the central-local relationship. Monitoring and assessing how collaboration between governments is working would provide a regular function for these councils, which so far appear to have been used for little more than general discussions, and could determine the degree to which collaborative governance does come to have transformative effects for English mayors.
Acknowledgement: Thanks to Sarah Ayres and Kate Lyonette for their thoughts on a previous draft.
The views and opinions expressed in this post are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the Bennett Institute for Public Policy.
